In the wake of the global financial crisis, borrowers found it increasingly challenging to obtain finance. Once credit had dried up, the pendulum swayed in favour of lenders during loan negotiations. In an effort to avoid and terminate unprofitable loan agreements, major banking institutions relied heavily on the punitive provisions that were set out in loan contracts, particularly the draconian material adverse change clause. Against this background, this paper analyses the material adverse change clause with particular reference to case law. It also examines defences that a borrower can seek to rely on in court, following the Turkish case of Cukurova Finance. The paper considers the doctrine of relief of forfeiture in the context of loan agreements and argues that it is a remedy a borrower should seek to raise in court. The doctrine permits a borrower to mitigate the severity of punitive clauses when an event of default is triggered.
terminate the loan. 15 Once a MAC clause is triggered, the aftermath could prove to be grievous as financial stability and trust between the parties is broken. The default cuts the strings attaching the credit to the borrower and leaves the debtor in uncharted waters as he searches for foreign capital in an attempt to pay back the creditor. There will be no obligation on behalf of the lender to generate more capital or 'exonerate good money after bad' to the borrower. 16 Hence, the clause is purposely envisioned to be absolute by tipping the pendulum and bargaining power in favour of the bank.
In order to mitigate risk and maximise protection for the lender, Youard highlights the importance of prudence when drafting a MAC clause. In his view, the purpose of a MAC clause is to 'specify the circumstances in which the lender can [lawfully] ask for immediate repayment' of the outstanding capital, before the predicted date of maturity of the loan agreement. 17 During negotiations, the creditor's solicitors will identify all notable concerns that the lender has regarding any events of default and the clause will be drafted with these in mind.
In contrast, the borrower's solicitors will attempt to mitigate the wide-ranging scope of the MAC clause. In order to appreciate the scope of the clause, the following section looks at the criteria that need to be fulfilled in the three elements of 'Material', 'Adverse', and 'Change'.
Material
The first criterion, the material, is outlined as a 'long-term and substantial' 18 impact, since a 'temporary change [or after-effect] in a borrower's circumstances is unlikely to be treated as material' or important. 19 In Levison v Farin, it was held that the 'scale of impact necessary for a material adverse change to be called, was a 20% fall in the value of a company's assets.'
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For instance, Zarkzewski clarifies that for a change to be material, it must simply '[affect] the borrower's ability to repay, or significantly increase the risks assumed by the lender'. 21 This broadens the scope of what can amount to material. In order for the adverse effect to be regarded as material, all circumstances and facts must be prudently measured, since the more precise the clause is about what changes will be of a significant nature, the easier it will be for the creditor to rely on the clause. 22 However, it is the lender who must prove that this impairs the borrower's ability to perform its commitments and repay the loan. Unlike the borrower, the lender has secured his position by incorporating a MAC clause into an agreement, since it provides scope to terminate the agreement based on a subjective belief that the borrower's financial condition has deteriorated.
Adverse
The second criterion is that the change must be 'adverse' in nature and contrary to the lender's initial forecasts when the loan was negotiated. This usually involves the borrower's financial stability. Zakrzewski suggests reference to the Oxford English Dictionary to appreciate the scope of this word which defines adverse as: 'opposing any one's real or supposed interests [or expectations]; hence an unfavourable, hurtful, detrimental, injurious, calamitous, [or] afflictive'. 23 The majority of lenders' reasonable view is that an adverse effect must be detrimental in order for it to trigger an immediate event of default. The default will be decided by exercising the lenders subjective judgment of what constitutes a calamitous effect on the borrower's circumstances, which increases the scope of the lender's security against the borrower.
Change
The third requirement that must be established is that there has been a degree of 'change'. A change can be defined as a variation or a sequence of anomalies in the circumstances or dealings of the borrower, which merit the termination of a loan agreement. The key variation will usually concern, but not limited to, the commercial dealings and financial wellbeing of the borrower. In order for the clause to be triggered, the degree of change must prevent a borrower or his/her business's ability to pay back the creditor, due to an exacerbating degree of variation in circumstances.
C. THE ORTHODOX POSITION
It is trite law in the UK that there is no envisioned room for a borrower to rely on equity to intervene in strictly negotiated banking agreements. 24 The Supreme Court in Burmah Oil 25 held that the parties to an agreement are bound by the strict contractual interpretation of the terms that they agreed to in the contract. In this case, the claimant could not undermine or set aside the loan based on it being 'unconscionable and inequitable '. 26 This verifies the weight the courts place on contractual terms and how they will rank above any dogma of good faith.
Similarly, the argument that a loan agreement should be set aside due to it being unconscionable was rejected in Multiservice Bookbinding Ltd v Marden. 27 Here, the courts held that a literal approach would be used when interpreting the terms of the loan and so there would be no room for equity to intervene. In contrast, under New York law, the courts seem to take a more generous stance. amounted to a breach of obligations that Carey had consented to under the agreement. As a result, GHU maintained that the defendant should be liable to pay damages for an unwarranted acceleration. Carey counter-claimed that GHU had defaulted within the terms of the loan agreement when the work on the structure of the building ceased and it failed to make payment of the interest due. Reference was made to Gardiner & Theobald's due diligence report which proved GHU's deteriorating position. 33 The creditor considered that since GHU was near insolvency, it was not required to extend their risk and resume more money under the facility agreement to the borrower. Therefore, Carey demanded a repayment of €55.4 million. In order to ascertain whether a financial deterioration had occurred, Blaire J turned to the construal of what the financial condition of the company encompassed when the agreement had been set contract. There is no room for equity to intervene and remedy the contract-breaker. 49 It is expected that the courts would in any case be reluctant to step away from precedent. It appears that lenders have safeguarded and strengthened their position. They have left very little scope for a borrower to remedy a default.
BNP Paribas v Yukos
The creditor's strong position was also illustrated in the frozen. As a result, the loans under the agreement became due. Yukos Oil argued that the notice of the event of default was damaging to the Group and that in reality, the claimants stood to benefit from the 'wrongful act', 52 triggering the default. Evans-Lombe J rejected the claimant's submission and held that there was no reasonable prospect that Yukos could prove that BNP Paribas had relied on unreasonable information, which benefited them to terminate the contract.
He referred to the dicta held by LJ Cockburn in Stirling v Maitland, 53 that 'if a party enters into an arrangement which can only take effect by continuance of a certain existing set of circumstances, there is an implied engagement on his part that he shall do nothing of his own motive to put an end to that state of circumstances under which the engagement can be operative'. 54 The claimants argued that the material adverse effect should be considered on the 'business, condition or production or export capacity of the Group taken as a whole'. 55 The defendants claimed that although the borrower faced financial difficulties, it had not affected the capacity of the Group as a whole. Hence, they disputed the MAC despite Yukos filing for a US bankruptcy petition and defaulting on its payment of interest. The Chancery division applied the Stirling principle and held that in order for the event of default to constitute a breach 49 Burmah Oil (n 5). 50 of contract, the defendant would need to prove that there was an implied term in the loan agreement, in which the bank had agreed not to accelerate. 56 As such, the banks succeeded in their claim and were entitled to demand full repayment of the money. The case of BNP Paribas cemented the orthodox position that there was no room for equity to intervene in contractual loan agreements to remedy a breach. This proves that more often than not, the pendulum swings in favour of the creditor in the UK, especially when the borrower is bound by stringent terms under a loan agreement. 
D. RELIEF OF FORFEITURE

a) Court Proceedings
The High Court considered whether there had been a legitimate event of default and if so, whether ATT could legally appropriate the shares. Bannister J who heard the arguments held that all sixteen of the alleged events of default were unsuccessful. It was held that even if the defendant had failed to justify the appropriation of the shares, because of its bad faith and improper motive, it would not avail the claimant's argument. 81 The claimant also raised the doctrine of relief of forfeiture. Bannister J brushed over the argument and held that it was unnecessary to consider as the defendant was obliged to return the shares. The Court of Appeal reversed the High Court decision and held that three events of default had in fact occurred. 82 It did, however, agree with the High Court that any improper motive on behalf of the defendant would not benefit the claimants. 83 As such, it was held that ATT was entitled to appropriate the charged shares and upheld ATT's appeal. The subsidiary companies appealed, arguing that no event of default had in fact occurred. In the event it had, however, the claimants should be entitled to relief from forfeiture since the appropriation of the shares was vitiated on bad faith.
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Bannister J followed the High Court and reaffirmed in obiter dictum that ATT entered into the facility agreement and its associated instruments in the expectation that CH and CFI would default, with the intention of gaining shareholder control of Turkcell. 85 Nonetheless, it was rejected as under contract law, ATT was entitled to terminate the loan based on their subjective opinion that a MAC had occurred. The critical question turned to whether the courts had the prerequisite jurisdiction to grant the claimant relief of forfeiture, considering that the repayment of the loan to ATT was secured by equitable mortgages over the charged shares in Turkcell. In wider scope to intervene in international loan agreements, where property was used as collateral and to offer the borrower a second chance to rectify the contract. As revealed in 90 where it is possible to assert that the object of the transaction and of the insertion of the right to forfeit is to secure the payment of money, equity has been willing to relieve on terms that the payment is made with interest. 91 As such, the claimants stated that there was sufficient precedent, which illustrated that it was possible for equity to intervene and soften the consequences of an event of default following a MAC clause.
Shiloh Spinners Ltd v Harding
Peachy v Duke of Somerset,
Section 146(2) of the Law and Property Act 1925 also sets out that a court has the authority and discretion to grant or reject relief if notice of the breach has been provided, as well as a reasonable time thereafter to remedy the breach if it is achievable of being remedied.
However, an issue that arose was whether the courts had jurisdiction to relieve the claimants in this case as it concerned shares; intangible property under a commercial agreement, as opposed to proprietary or personal rights under a contractual agreement. The courts held that there was no basis or authority to draw such a discrepancy, relying on the dicta affirmed by Dillion LJ in BICC plc v Burndy Corporation. 92 They explained that it was necessary to be entirely 'certain' 93 about the transaction and to consider other detailed factors regarding the default, such as 'the gravity of the breaches, the disparity between the value of the property of which forfeiture is claimed as compared with the damage caused by the breach.' 94 Nonetheless, it seems that whether a borrower can provide this remains at the judge's discretion. In Hyman v Rose, 95 Earl Loreburn LC elaborated on the level of discretion and held that the circumstances, including the conduct of the parties is to be considered by the court. 96 As a result, Cozens-Hardy MR depicted the necessity for Cukurova to remedy the breaches alleged in the notice, and pay reasonable compensation for the breaches which could not be remedied.
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Since the Cukurova Group had the ability to repay ATT, the Board held that the claimant should be entitled to relief from forfeiture.
b) Implications
Cukurova marks the first major deviation from a traditionally strict contractual approach.
Previously, courts had routinely been in favour of banks and in particular, the terms of the expected that the pendulum will swing more equally in court for both the borrower and the lender. This paper suggests that a borrower should now seek to raise the defence of relief from forfeiture or attempt to incorporate equitable relief as a term in the loan agreement, during the negotiating process. Today, a borrower should not be at the mercy of the lender if he is able to contend that he has the ability to pay back the money owed under the loan agreement. In parallel, it is advised that a lender should still seek to rely on the traditional contractual provisions such as financial covenants, representations and cross-default clauses. However, it is likely that this type of remedy has several limitations. There is no evidence to prove that Cukurova has actually sent shockwaves throughout the financial markets. For instance, in the situation where the borrower is utterly insolvent, there will be no room for relief of forfeiture, as it is unlikely that another lender will provide additional capital if its credit rating has suffered. It is also debatable whether this remedy was only based on the individual facts of
Cukurova.
It is yet to be seen whether the case will set a precedent in the UK. On the other hand, with the development and invasion of the property doctrine into a financial context, one may argue that it unseals the floodgates for other areas of law to also intervene, such as human rights law. 101 What is clear, however, is that relief from forfeiture has provided a loophole for equity to interfere and soften the harsh and draconian aftermath of the event of default. It has the ability to mitigate the severity of a MAC clause when an event of default has been triggered or the loan has been hastily accelerated, leading to an unfair or illegal result.
E. OTHER DEFENCES
It is also important to explore other defences that an insolvent borrower should choose to consider in the event of a default. 102 These could pertain to: (i) Section 3(2) 
The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977
Zakrzewki states that a borrower should seek to rely on the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (UCTA 1977) to mitigate the scope of the MAC clause. Section 3(2)(b) sets out that a borrower:
cannot by reference to any contractual term claim to be entitled to: a) render a contractual performance substantially different from that which was reasonably expected of him, or b) render no performance at all, except in so far as the contract term satisfies the requirement of reasonableness.
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Zakrzewski clarifies this by stating that a written standard form suggests 'pre-printed contract forms or terms flashed up on a website rather than terms proffered by a party as a starting point for negotiations.' 104 Once the standard form is satisfied, the borrower will still need to prove that the MAC clause does not fulfill the reasonableness condition. The borrower will also need to prove that the bank's termination of the loan agreement has in itself varied the contractual performance substantially from that which was reasonably expected of the borrower. However, this interpretation is questionable. The borrower would fail to satisfy that he is a consumer, able to invoke section 3(2)(b) of the UCTA 1977.
Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. As the GKOs were exchanged using US dollars, Springwell lost a significant amount of money due to currency fluctuations and raised the argument that there was a duty of care owed to Springwell and so a negligent misstatement had experience of an intellectual investor, then it will be contractually estopped from disputing that it was induced into entering into the contract.
Force Majeure Clause
Zakrzewski's proposal that a borrower should claim that a MAC clause is in fact a force majeure clause is also questionable. 112 Although he provides an innovative argument, it is unlikely that courts will find in favour of this based on the following reasons. First, Zakrzewski states that the function of A MAC clause is virtually identical to the nature of the force majeure clause and should be treated within the umbrella of the force majeure jurisprudence, because of the lack of case law in this area. 113 Although the author agrees that both a force majeure and a MAC clause do share resemblances, the latter does not have an identical definition. For instance, Beale defines a force majeure clause as:
any contractual term by which one, or both of the parties is excused from performance of the contract, in whole or in part, or is entitled to suspend performance or to claim an extension of time for performance, upon the happening of a specified event beyond his control. suggests 'adopting the jurisprudence that has developed around force majeure clauses' 116 and applying this to MAC clauses. In the opinion of the author, it would be a misnomer to adopt this argument. The case law in this area would have to be disregarded, since commercially a MAC clause shifts the risks of harmful events or changes onto the borrower, whereas a force majeure clause only acts to excuse one of the party's obligations. 117 Thus, the doctrine of strict liability still applies with reference to the MAC clause. In contrast, the doctrine does not apply when a force majeure clause has been stipulated in a contract, as there would be an element of debt relief or forgiveness for non-performance.
Contractual Protections
Alternatively, a borrower could ask the lender to apply an objective interpretation of what is meant by the term 'material'. As Gray states, a subjective construal provides with no legal certainty as to whether any given set of circumstances constitute a MAC. 118 Nonetheless, this provides scope for the creditor to draw down the loan agreement when he chooses, which is why loan agreements generally employ a subjective test. 119 In more extreme circumstances, a borrower may dispute that the bank wrongly accelerated, and attempt to sue for economic torts.
115 Chitty on Contracts (n 47) explains that a contract may be discharged on the ground of frustration when something occurs after the formation of the contract, which renders it impossible to fulfil the contract or transforms the obligation to perform into a radically different obligation from that undertaken during the formation of the contract. Although an incorrect acceleration will legally result in damages, it is suggested that the borrower should seek to challenge the lender's discretion, however unlikely, by applying contractual protections such as a de minimis threshold. It is a clause that endeavours to re-price the deal on a quarterly or yearly basis or impose a grace period, if the failure to pay the installment under the loan agreement is due to a technical error. Nevertheless, this depends on the individual facts of each case and the creditor's judgment. For example, a creditor must consider whether it is in his interests for the loan to continue in operation as the borrower's failure to meet the conditions of the loan may be the 'tip of the iceberg '. 120 This would lead to further deliquesce in the borrower's financial condition.
It is hoped that this section will provide for a set of considerations to explore for future borrowers who have suffered events of default. Although the aforementioned defences may be criticised as feeble, they offer the borrower the opportunity to make the most of a difficult position. The author agrees with Zackrzewski that these defences 'would require rather exceptional circumstances to be established at trial'. 121 Hence, the relief of forfeiture doctrine may be considered a more substantial defence for a borrower to challenge a bank in court.
However, it remains to be seen whether the case of Cukurova was an exception to case law, decided on the basis of its facts, or whether it will be used by courts in future.
F. CONCLUSION
This paper has articulated the relevant cases and considered the property doctrine of relief from forfeiture. It has established that following Cukurova, the pendulum does not swing only in the direction of a lender. Now, it swings more equally to the borrower as well. It appears that equity will be able to intervene in a financial context when a MAC clause has occurred, effectively leading to an event of default. Focusing on equity's development throughout the common law, the paper has presented a case study of the orthodox position, placing particular focus on Concord and Cukurova. These two cases have ingeniously widened the liberty for equity to incorporate a property law doctrine and shield a defaulting borrower. In conclusion, it will be exciting to see how the MAC clauses will evolve, following the ensuing case law. It is expected that there is scope for equity to intervene and mitigate the severity of a material adverse change clause, when an event of default has been triggered following the intrusion of relief from forfeiture.
